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Foreword 
It was not until the end of 1988 that the European Community reached an 
agreement on a Directive to regulate the emission of sulfur and nitrogen ox-
ides from large combustion plants. A major element in the discussion was 
the expected cost of the Directive and the ensuing impacts on macroeco-
nomic indicators such as employment, GDP, current balance, and consumer 
prices in EC countries. This report describes a study carried out on be-
half of the CEC - a study unique in one respect, since, for the first time, 
an international model (INTERLINK from the OECD) was used to exam-
ine the macroeconomic impacts of coordinated pollution control policies in a 
number of countries. The study made use of the data on emissions and pollu-
tion control costs from the RAINS (Regional Acidification INformation and 
Simulation) model developed at IIASA, but goes one step further by also 
assessing the indirect impacts of pollution control measures on economic 
development. The study shows that not only the direct costs of pollution 
control are relevant, but also that the indirect impacts of a coordinated 
environmental policy result in a remarkable difference in macroeconomic 
performance among the EC countries. Although, generally, the impacts are 
small, some countries benefit more from a coordinated environmental policy 
than others. 
ill 
MARKUS AMANN 
Leader 
Regional Air Pollution Project 

Macroeconomic Impacts of an EEC 
Policy to Control Air Pollution 
Ger Klaassen, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, and Andries Nentjes, State University, 
Groningen 
The OECD INTERLINK model was used to assess the macroeconomic impacts of 
a European Community directive to control air pollution . For this purpose the model 
was adapted. To meet the directive the EC would have to invest some 15 billion ECU. 
The annual costs would be 3 .4 billion ECU in 1993. The simulation results suggest 
that the macroeconomic impacts are small and are positive during the investment 
period and more negative in the subsequent period. Differences in results among EC 
countries are expected. These not only are due to differences in pollution control costs 
but also result from indirect impacts of coordination. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Acid rain is one of the major environmental problems in the European 
Community. The sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions of 
power plants, refineries, and industries contribute to the problem to a 
large extent. The EC has been negotiating on strategies to control these 
acidifying emissions . Recent discussions have focused on a directive on 
large combustion plants, proposed by the Commission of the European 
Community. A major element in these discussions were the expected 
costs and ensuing economic impacts for the national economies. 
The assessment of the macroeconomic impacts of pollution control 
policies has been the subject of numerous studies . According to an 
OECD overview of national studies of effects of pollution, the mac-
roeconomic impacts are generally very small (OECD, 1984). Rose 
(1983), in an overview of experience in the United States with the 
modeling of macroeconomic impacts of air pollution abatement, felt 
tempted to affirm that impacts were only minor but added that no 
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definite answer could be given on the expansionary or contractionary 
implications for the economy. Christainsen and Tietenberg ( 1985) 
stressed the uncertainty of the quantitative impacts but found evidence 
that permitted the conclusion that adverse employment and productivity 
impacts apparently have been small, although geographically and sec-
torally concentrated. In a 1985 survey, the OECD (1985) suggested 
that the initial, positive impact of environmental expenditures might 
outweigh the long-term, negative impacts of higher prices and eroded 
business profits. 
The studies reviewed by Rose, the OECD, Christainsen and Tie-
tenberg, and others have one major drawback . They describe the mac-
roeconomic impacts only of isolated, national policies to control 
pollution. Although most models do examine the impacts on exports 
and imports, they do not include the consequences of simultaneous 
implementation of various national policies or the impacts of a coor-
dinated international policy . 
This contribution differs from the above studies in that it presents 
a study that assesses the macroeconomic impacts, for a number of 
countries, of an international policy to control pollution (Klaassen et 
al., 1988a). For the analysis an existing international model was used: 
the international linkage model of the OECD, INTERLINK. 
In the text that follows, Section 2 describes the proposed EC directive 
and the associated costs. Section 3 discusses the main channels through 
which pollution control affects the economy and how one might capture 
these impacts with a macroeconomic model . Section 4 introduces the 
structural features of INTERLINK. The specific modifications are pre-
sented in Section 5. In Section 6 the results of the policy simulations 
are described and discussed. 
2. THE PROPOSED EC DIRECTIVE AND ITS COSTS 
2A. Introduction 
The draft EC directive pertains to sulphur dioxyde (S02) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOJ emissions from large combustion plants and stipulates 
that new plants larger in thermal capacity than 50 megawatts must 
comply with emission standards that are related to the size of the plant. 
In addition, EC member states are to reduce the total emissions from 
these large combustion plants by the end of 1993. 
Table 1 shows the proposed reductions (which use 1980 as a base 
year) that reflect discussions as of mid-1987 . These reductions were 
used to estimate the costs and macroeconomic impacts. They differ 
Table 1: Emission Reductions and Costs 
S02 NO, 
S02 emission NO, emission 
reduction abated Annual costs Investments reduction abated Annual costs 
Country (%of 1980) (kiloton) (million ECUs)" (million ECUs)' (%of 1980) (kiloton) (million ECUs) 
Belgium 45 67 46 238 30 21 2 
Denmark 45 201 103 436 30 78 7 
France 45 0 0 0 30 0 0 
FR Germany 45• 1,716 977 4,769 30• 727 667 
Greece 0 25 II 31 O' 0 0 
Ireland 0 64 40 168 0 20 3 
Italy 45 753 439 2,319 30 460 189 
Luxemburg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 45• 256 129 633 30 52 7 
Portugal O' 0 0 0 0 63 29 
Spain 10 180 93 500 10 95 4 
United Kingdom 45 1,344 628 3,160 30 339 28 
EEC < 45 4,606 2,455 12,253 < 30 1,878 935 
' In 1985 prices. 
•Actual reduction higher than the required target. Costs and emission abated correspond with these higher reductions . 
' Granted an increase. 
Investments 
(million ECUs) 
26 
65 
0 
1,620 
0 
22 
577 
0 
83 
149 
51 
289 
2,882 
w 
.i:. 
'° 
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from the ones that were agreed upon in mid-1988, after submission of 
the results of this study to the EC. According to the accepted directive, 
S02 emissions are to be reduced by a minimum of 40 percent, except 
in Denmark (34 percent), the United Kingdom (20 percent), and Italy 
(27 percent). Spain is allowed a standstill and Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal are allowed to increase their emissions by, respectively 6, 
25, and 102 percent (Haigh, 1989). Reductions in NOx emissions are 
generally some 20 percent by 1993. Spain and Italy, however, are 
allowed a standstill and Greece, Ireland, and Portugal may increase 
NOx emissions by 94, 79, and 157 percent. 
Strategies to control emissions may range from technical measures, 
such as flue gas desulfurization, to a switch in fuel mix or additional 
energy conservation measures. This study examined only technical 
abatement measures. In order to comply with the directive's emission 
standards new large power plants generally will have to apply flue gas 
desulfurization to control S02 emissions and combustion modification 
to reduce NOx emissions. The standard for new large industrial plants 
requires various abatement techniques, which vary with the size of the 
installation. 
2B. Emissions and Costs 
In estimating the costs and investments we have assumed that coun-
tries would comply with the proposed directive as follows. First, mea-
sures are taken to meet the emission standards for new plants . If this 
does not lead to the required percentage reduction, additional measures 
on existing plants or more stringent ones for new plants would be taken 
in the most cost-effective way. Some EC countries (Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands), however, have 
already accepted national legislation to control S02 and NOx emissions. 
If these policies are more stringent than the EC Directive, the abatement 
measures of the national legislation are incorporated into the analysis. 
If the national policy is less stringent, additional measures were as-
sumed to meet the requirements of the directive proposal. 
Whether compliance with the directive's emission standards is suf-
ficient to meet the required overall reductions depends on the level of 
emissions in 1993 without abatement. The volume of unabated emis-
sions depends on the structure of future energy supply, the level of 
energy demand, and the emission per unit of energy. As a result (Table 
1) the volume of emissions that has to be abated varies considerably 
among the EC member states. Differences in costs and investments 
mainly depend on the volume of emission that has to be abated. To a 
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smaller extent they result from differences in the (average) costs per 
ton emission-controlled . These costs per ton depend on the abatement 
technology and on country-specific factors such as the size of the plant, 
its operating hours, the fuel type, and the sulphur content of the fuel 
(Klaassen et al. , I 988b). 
Table 1 shows that Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom would 
have to bear most of the costs. In Germany this is so because the 
country would continue with the application of its national policy, 
which is more stringent than the proposed directive. In Italy and the 
United Kingdom the large share of coal-fired power plants, in com-
bination with the 45 percent reduction, explains the relatively large 
volume of S02 and NO, emissions that need abatement. France would 
not have to take measures because of its large share of nuclear power 
plants . Luxemburg would not need to take steps because autonomous 
developments in pollution are sufficient to meet the standstill require-
ments . Portugal would not incur any costs to control its S02 emission, 
since it is granted an increase. The same applies for Greece regarding 
its NO, emission . The average costs per ton S02 removed are quite 
similar from one country to the next. By contrast, the costs per ton 
NO, emission do vary considerably . These costs would be high in 
Germany, Portugal, and Italy because a relatively expensive technique 
(selective catalytic reduction) has to be applied to attain the required 
emission reductions . 
3. GENERAL METHODOLOGY TO ESTIMATE 
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS 
3A. Effects of Pollution Control 
Measures to control pollution influence the economy through various 
channels. Three categories of impacts can be distinguished, related (I) 
to the expenditures on pollution control equipment, (2) to the cost of 
pollution control, and (3) to the reduction in environmental damage 
("benefits"). 
The additional investments in pollution control, or environmental 
investments, will cause expenditure and consumption to rise so that 
the gross domestic product increases. This induces additional employ-
ment and imports. Operating the pollution control equipment has sim-
ilar consequences. The positive effects influence results especially in 
the period in which the environmental investments take place. In the 
same period these investments may cause either a direct or an indirect 
crowding out of other, traditional business investments . This has a 
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negative influence on production capacity, level of output, and em-
ployment. Pollution control costs will affect aggregate supply perfor-
mance by depressing business profits and raising market prices. The 
resulting deterioration in competitiveness of industries will cause a 
decrease in production and exports. Lower business profits may reduce 
the volume of investments, production capacity, and related jobs. Ris-
ing pollution control costs for consumers will reduce private con-
sumption. The contractionary consequences of pollution control costs 
will become manifest mainly after the investment period. 
Since pollution control aims at improving the quality of the envi-
ronment, the reduction in environmental damage is also important. 
One might make a distinction between "cost-reducing," "output-
increasing," and "utility-increasing" damage reductions or benefits 
(OECD, 1984). In principle the first two types of benefits might be 
included in a macroeconomic evaluation, since they are reflected in 
the level of production. All existing macroeconomic studies neglect 
these benefits because of an incomplete understanding of the physi-
cal relations between pollution and environmental damage (Alcamo 
et al., 1987) and the limited possibilities of expressing the damage 
in monetary terms (Klaassen, J 988a). Moreover, inclusion of utility-
increasing benefits in a macroeconomic evaluation is impossible: These 
benefits are not expressed in market goods or services and their value 
is not reflected in the gross domestic product. Consequently this study 
had to be restricted to the impacts of costs and expenditures, excluding 
environmental benefits. 
3B. Making Use of a Macroeconomic Model 
One way to capture the range of impacts of expenditures on, and 
costs of, pollution control is to use an existing macroeconomic model 
and, where necessary, to adapt it. Such an approach has been adopted 
in the Netherlands (Central Planbureau, 1982). The principal useful-
ness is that the net overall influence exerted upon the economy and 
the interdependencies in an economy are taken into account. The model 
offers a context for the comparison of effects of environmental policy 
with various other types of policies. The experience and knowledge 
embodied in the econometric core model can be used. 
The starting point of such a macroeconomic evaluation is an ex-
ogenously determined time path for the additional environmental in-
vestments and the (net) annual costs of the pollution control program. 
These investments and costs are disaggregated into relevant categories, 
such as capital costs (interest and depreciation), labor costs, and costs 
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of raw material and energy, and they are expressed in constant prices. 
Also, data may be included on the mode of financing of the invest-
ments, the type of management (government, private sector), and the 
distribution of costs (consumers, producers, government). 
The second step involves making a reference projection for the 
economic development without the costs and investments of pollution 
control. Next a projection is made including these costs and invest-
ments . The differences in impacts between the two projections can be 
ascribed to the environmental policy. 
4. THE MULTICOUNTRY MODEL: 
OECD'S INTERLINK 
4A. Introduction 
To evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of a coordinated EC 
air pollution control program, simulations have to be made with an 
international model that includes each of the EC countries individually. 
For this study the January 1987 version of the OECD's INTERLINK 
model was used. 
INTERLINK (Llewellyn and Richardson, 1985; OECD, 1988; Rich-
ardson, 1988) is a short- to medium-term multicountry model in which 
the economies of 23 OECD countries (the OECD area bloc) and 6 
non-OECD regions are modeled separately. These country models can 
be linked via world trade and financial flows. The influence of one 
country or region on the rest of the world, including the feedback 
effects following from this interaction, can thus be assessed. Within 
the OECD, the INTERLINK model plays an important role in the 
context of its regular forecasting exercises (semiannual "OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook"), and also policy-related simulation studies (see, e.g . , 
EC Commission, 1988). For this study INTERLINK was used to set 
up baseline projections and then to simulate the effects of additional 
pollution control investments for the various EC countries. 
4B. Structure of INTERLINK 
The general structure of recent versions of the INTERLINK model 
is described by Richardson (1988). It consists of an OECD area bloc, 
a non-OECD regional bloc, and a set of world trade and financial 
linkages between these countries and regions. In the OECD area bloc 
the models for the four major EC countries (Germany, France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom) are considerably more detailed than those 
for the smaller EC countries, although there is a high degree of struc-
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tural similarity. Models for the major economies include detailed sup-
ply blocks. The production structure is used to define a concept of 
normal output. The actual level of output is specified with the factor 
utilization rate . Derived factor demand equations are specified as dy-
namic adjustments to desired factor inputs . Via input costs, the supply 
structure is linked to the determination of output prices. The cost 
markup is influenced by the prices of foreign competitors and the 
intensity of factor utilization. Endogenous labor supply, and hence 
unemployment, is a final element of the supply blocks . 
For the smaller OECD countries there are no consistent supply 
blocks. Labor supply is exogenous and the demand for labor is a 
function of the demand-determined production level and of real wages. 
Business fixed investments depend on output changes and long-term 
real interest rates. The concept of price formation is comparable with 
the one for major OECD economies. 
For the four largest EC countries the short-term interest rates are 
exogenous and they determine the short-term rates in the other OECD 
countries . Long-term interest rates are determined through a distributed 
lag of short-term interest rates. 
Remaining equations are, to a large extent, comparable for all OECD 
country models. Government deficits are endogenous for all OECD 
countries . Private consumption is a function of real disposable income, 
prices, and real interest rates. Export and import volumes depend on 
world trade and on relative price competitiveness . Wage rates have 
been modeled primarily as a function of labor market conditions, trend 
productivity, and prices. For non-OECD areas, INTERLINK contains 
rudimentary reduced-form models. The world trade and financial link-
age block provides a description of the principal mechanisms through 
which the OECD economies interact with each other and with non-
OECD regions . A consistent set of export volume and import price 
estimates for each OECD country and non-OECD region are deter-
mined so that the sum of changes in countries' imports correspond to 
the sum of changes in countries' exports . Changes in countries' export 
prices have their full counterpart in partner countries' import prices . 
International financial linkages are based on a portfolio balance model 
of exchange rate determination. 
5. MODIFICATIONS IN INTERLINK 
SA. Introduction 
The macroeconomic impacts of pollution control to be captured by 
INTERLINK are related to two exogenous impulses: (1) the invest-
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ments in pollution control equipment; and (2) the operating costs of 
pollution control equipment (also called environmental exploitation 
expenditures) . 
The models in both small and large EC countries had to be adapted 
in such a way that they reflected the following properties of environ-
mental expenditures: 
1. Investments in pollution control raise aggregate demand but do 
not increase the capacity to produce marketable output. 
2. Operation of pollution control equipment raises total production 
costs and the costs per unit output. 
Because models of the large EC countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom) contain a detailed set of supply equations, 
adaptations were more elaborate and complicated than those made to 
the small EC country models. The modifications (Klaassen et al., 
1988b) consisted, first of all, of defining new variables-the environ-
mental investments and various types of environmental costs-and of 
formulating additional definition equations. Second, the new variables 
were inserted into the original equations of the INTERLINK model. 
Third, some of the existing equations had to be adapted . 
SB. The Set of Environmental Equations 
The first step involved the definition of a set of new variables. We 
distinguished the following annual pollution control costs: capital costs 
(interest and depreciation), costs of energy, costs of other materials, 
and labor costs . Their value was expressed in constant prices at factor 
costs for a specific year. The volume of each cost variable was trans-
formed from constant factor costs into current market prices by making 
use of deftators and input/output coefficients . The above modifications 
were similar in both small and large EC models. For the small countries 
capital costs of environmental capital were determined exogenously . 
For large countries these costs were endogenously calculated by making 
use of the detailed supply blocks. The rate of depreciation of envi-
ronmental capital was assumed to be equal to that of other business 
fixed investments. 
SC. Modification of Existing Variables and Equations 
The second step involved the modification of existing variables and 
equations. Here we present the modifications according to the blocks 
of equations in which they appear: the expenditure account, the supply 
block, the wage and domestic price block, and remaining sets of 
equations. 
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The expenditure equations had to be adjusted to ensure that the 
environmental investments and the operating expenses increased the 
appropriate expenditure categories. First, the total volume of private 
investment was altered; environmental investment was added to tra-
ditional business fixed investments. This modification implied the 
assumption that the import share of pollution control equipment 
equaled that for total business fixed investments. Since no data were 
available on the specific import coefficient for air pollution control 
equipment, this appeared the most plausible assumption to make. 
No direct crowding out of other business investments was assumed 
to take place. Because the majority of the environmental investments 
have to be undertaken by (usually semipublic) enterprises in elec-
tricity generation, we did not expect that financial constraints were 
to depress nonenvironmental investments. Second, the volume of 
annual costs for operating pollution control equipment was added to 
the final demand components in the volume of final domestic demand 
equation. 
In the supply block, for large EC country mod~ls potential gross 
output, or production capacity, is a function of actual employment 
and of effective capital; however, the environmental investments do 
not increase production capacity. Consequently additional pollution 
control (environmental) capital was not included in the equations 
defining production capacity. On the other hand the environmental 
investments, as well as subsequent operating costs, do raise pro-
duction costs. Hence they had to be included in the equations de-
scribing production costs. After modification the gross domestic 
product included net environmental investments and operating ex-
penses. The business sector employment equation included employ-
ment due to the production of pollution control investments as well 
as employment in operating the equipment. The costs of pollution 
control required an adjustment in the definitions of average normal 
costs and of the growth rate of normal long-run costs: Capital as 
well as operating costs of pollution control were included in the 
definition. It should be noted that, by including environmental ex-
penditures in aggregate output and costs and by excluding environ-
mental investment from production capacity, the environmental 
expenditures increase the normal average costs of production. In 
addition to this cost-push impact, environmental expenditures exert 
a demand-pull impact on prices because a rise in actual output, 
given a constant nominal output, will increase the intensity of factor 
utilization. The changes made in the small EC models were rather 
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more simple. The level of industrial production was increased because 
of environmental investment and the additional use of energy and 
materials in the operating of the pollution control equipment. In 
addition, direct employment in operating environmental capital in-
creased dependent employment in the private sector. 
In the wage and price block, for large EC models the cost-push 
impact of pollution control on prices was ensured by adjusting the 
deftator for final domestic demand; the value of operating costs was 
added to the numerator and the volume of these expenditures to the 
denominator. The small EC country models do not contain detailed 
cost equations. The cost-push impact of the increase in pollution con-
trol costs was modeled by adding the increase in value of the operating 
costs and the value of environmental capital costs to the deftator for 
private consumption. In addition the deftator for final domestic demand 
was adjusted by adding the value of operating costs to the numerator 
and their volume to the denominator. 
Regarding the remaining blocks of equations, in the appropriation 
accounts only a modification in the government appropriation account 
was necessary. In large EC country models indirect taxes as well as 
subsidies were altered. It was assumed that pollution control invest-
ments were financed as traditional business fixed investments. In small 
EC country models the direct and indirect tax revenues from operating 
costs and pollution control investments were taken into account. Fi-
nally, an alteration in the energy block was made in both small and 
large EC country models, since the use of materials and energy in the 
exploitation of environmental capital leads to an increase in the demand 
for the imports of energy. 
SD. Operating the System 
The proposed directive would lead to pollution control investments 
in the period 1988-1993. To ensure that the impact of the pollution 
control costs was sufficiently reflected, the simulation period needed 
to be extended to include the period 1994-1997. INTERLINK is a 
medium-term model and its data base did not allow a projection beyond 
1992. Therefore a shift in time horizon was introduced. In the model 
simulations investments were assumed to take place in the period 1983-
1988. This permitted simulation over the full period 1983-1992, in-
cluding a period (1989-1993) in which no environmental investments 
are made. Results obtained for the simulation period 1983-1992 are 
seen as a proxy for results in the period 1988-1997. It is possible from 
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Table 2: Investments and Costs of Pollut ion Control (in Millio n ECUs in 1985 
Prices) 
Total Annual Investments Annual costs 
investments costs as% of as% of 
Country (1988-1993) (1993) GDP in 1985 GDP in 1985 
Belgium 264 48 0.03 0.05 
Denmark 50 1 110 O.o? 0 .14 
France 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Germany 6,389 1,644 0.08 0.20 
Greece 31 II 0.01 O.o3 
Ireland 190 43 0 .08 0 .18 
Italy 2,869 628 0.05 0. 11 
Luxemburg 0 0 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 71 6 136 0.04 0.08 
Portugal 149 29 0.06 0. 11 
Spain 551 97 0.03 0.05 
United Kingdom 3,449 656 0.06 0.11 
EC 15 , 135 3,390 0.05 0.10 
the simulations (covering the period 1983-1992) to draw conclusions 
for the period 1988-1997, provided that the courses of macroeconomic 
development in the two periods are not too divergent. Moreover, since 
the results of the simulations are expressed as annual changes in eco-
nomic indicators over a baseline, or reference projection, these (rel-
ative) changes are not believed to be extremely sensitive to changes 
in the reference projection. 
6. SIMULATION RESULTS 
6A. Introduction 
The relative size of the pollution control investments and costs that 
were used as input for the model are presented in Table 2 . Investments 
are to be made in the period 1988-1993 and are equally distributed 
over the period. Annual costs increase gradually and remain constant, 
expressed in constant prices, after 1993. 
Certain assumptions were necessary in regard to the monetary, fiscal, 
and exchange rate policies. As a technical assumption nominal interest 
rates were kept constant; that is , monetary policies were fully accom-
modating. In addition government consumption and investment vol-
umes were held constant in real terms and nominal exchange rates 
were fixed. 
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6B. Results 
SIMILARITIES. The main feature of the results (Table 3) is that the 
macroeconomic impacts of the proposed directive are very small. A 
comparison of Table 2 with fluctuations in macroeconomic perfor-
mance over the period 1979-1985 (Eurostat, 1987; OECD, 1987a, 
1987b) showed that the impacts of the directive on gross domestic 
product (GDP), consumer prices, private consumption, and employ-
ment are generally less than one-tenth of the fluctuations in these 
indicators in the past. Only for a few indicators, for example, the 
private consumption level in Ireland and Denmark in the period 1994-
1997, are the impacts more prominent. The small extent of the impact 
is not surprising, since the costs and investments of the environmental 
program are rather small. 
In addition, as to the direction of the impacts there were some 
common features among the EC member states. In the investment 
period ( 1988-1993) the additional domestic as well as foreign ex-
penditure impulse has a predominantly positive influence on macro-
economic development, The impact on GDP is, to a certain extent, 
proportional to the size of the environmental investments. (cf. Table 
2, column 2 and Table 3, row 2). Together with GDP, other variables-
business investments, employment, and government financial bal-
ances-are influenced positively in most countries. Current balances 
are generally negatively affected because of the additional imports from 
non-EC countries generated by the higher EC spending. Despite the 
increase in nominal income the volume of consumption is hardly af-
fected, as consumer prices rise as well. In the second period (1994-
1997) the positive expenditure impact fades away, and the negative 
influence of pollution control costs dominate: GDP, investments, and 
employment fall, the current balance becomes less negative, and gov-
ernment financial balances are less positive. Consumer prices increase 
to a larger extent than nominal income; real disposable income de-
creases, which results in lower levels of consumption. Summarized 
over both periods the results are in line with the conclusions of previous 
national studies. These studies demonstrated that the positive macro-
economic impact on GDP and employment during the investment pe-
riod slightly exceeded the Joss of employment and the fall in GDP in 
subsequent years (OECD, 1985). Over both periods consumption is at 
a lower level, whereas consumer prices are at a higher level. The 
current balance is negatively affected. 
v; 
0--
0 
Table 3: The Macroeconomic Impacts for Each EEC Country 
BEL DEN GRE IRE NET POR SPA FRA GER ITA UKM 
Gross domestic product 
1988-1993 0. 15 0 .19 0 .07 0 . 13 0.15 0.12 0. 10 0.06 0. 19 0.11 0.07 
1994-1997 - 0.03 - 0 .01 0 .07 - 0.24 - 0.10 0.00 0 .04 0.03 - 0.06 0 .05 - 0.06 
Business fixed investment' 
1988-1993 0.69 1.48 0 .16• 1.30 0 .90 0.49' 0.43 - 1.54 1.44 1.19 
1994-1997 - 0.19 -0.25 0.04 - 0.41 - 0 .25 -0.D2 - 0.02 - -0.28 0 .21 - 0.ot 
Private consumption 
1988- 1993 0 .02 0 .00 0.01• 0.00 0 .01 0 .03' 0.04 - - 0.01 - 0 .03 - 0 .03 
1994-1997 - 0 .09 - 0. 18 0 .00 - 0 .33 - 0.03 - 0.02 - 0 .02 - - 0.07 - 0 .02 - 0.14 
Current balance• 
1988- 1993 0.02 -0.07 0 .00 - 0.06 - 0.D2 - 0 .02 0.01 0 . 12 - 0.36 - 0 .22 -0.22 
1994-1997 0.05 - 0.03 0.00 - 0.09 - 0.09 - 0.04 0.04 - 0.15 - 0.27 - 0 . 12 - 0 . 11 
Employment 
1988-1993 0 .07 0.05 0.03 0 .06 0 .10 0.06 0 .05 0.02 0 . 18 0 .03 0.04 
1994- 1997 0.01 0 .04 0.03 - 0 .05 - 0 .06 0 .00 0 .02 0 .03 - 0 . 14 0 .01 - 0.D7 
Consumer prices 
1988-1993 0 .18 0.23 0 .09 0 .51 0 .24 0 . 18 0.17 0 .08' 0.49 0.42 0.48 
1994-1997 0.40 0.42 0 .16 0 .66 0 .58 0 .3 1 0 .24 0.27 0 .36 0.14 0 .27 
Government financial Bal.' 
1988- 1993 0.08 0.12 0.01• 0.01 0 . 10 0 .02' 0.03 0.19 0 .13 0.09 
1994- 1997 0.05 0.07 0 .00 - 0 . 18 0 .01 0 .00 0 .01 0.09 0 .16 0.10 
Note: Figures expressed as average annual percentage changes from baseline levels . - , Not available . 
"Inclusive of environmental investment. • impact of abatement NO, emissions not available . 
bBillions of dollars. 'Impact of abatement SO, emissions not available. 
' Percentage of baseline gross domestic product. ' Detlator for GDP. 
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Table 4: The Macroeconomic Impacts for the EC 
Macroeconomic impacts• 
Gross domestic product 
Employment 
Consumptio~ 
Current balance 
Government financial balances 
Consumer prices 
(in billion ECU) 
(in 1000 man-years) 
(in billion ECU)" 
(in billion ECU) 
(in billion ECU)" 
(percentage change)' 
Note: Characteristics of the pollution control program: 
1988-1993 
3.9 
84.I 
-0.2 
- I. I 
3.2 
0.3 
Environmental investments per year (1988-1933) (billion ECU) 3.0 
Annual pollution control costs (from 1993 onwards) (billion ECU) 3.4 
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1994-1997 
-0.5 
-48.2 
-0.2 
- I.I 
2.6 
0.3 
•All figures expressed as average annual changes in the specific period in current prices. 
"Excluding France. 
' Weighted with the consumption volumes in each EEC country. 
Table 4 summarizes the aggregated impacts for the EC as a whole. 
From these figures the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1 . During the investment period ( 1988-1993) the multiplier for the 
EC as a whole is about 1. 3. 
2. The long-run opportunity costs of environmental protection, ex-
pressed in foregone consumption, are about five percent of the 
annual pollution control costs . 
3. The macroeconomic costs of the EC directive are considerably 
less of a burden than a partial analysis of the investments and 
costs would suggest; over both periods employment, GDP, and 
government financial balances are at a higher level, although 
consumer prices are higher and the EC current balance is more 
negative. 
DIFFERENCES IN COUNTRY RESULTS. Despite the similarities in the 
results for the various countries there are also differences . The pollution 
control program has a predominantly negative impact for Ireland, es-
pecially on GDP and employment. In the United Kingdom employment 
is negatively affected but GDP is hardly at all . Net impacts are positive 
for Spain, Portugal, and Greece and to a smaller extent also for Italy. 
The eventual consequences for the remaining countries are generally 
neutral to positive. The impact is somewhat less positive for Germany 
and the Netherlands and somewhat more for Belgium and Denmark. 
The effects for France, which has no pollution control costs, are pos-
itive as well. 
These differences can be explained by differences in the volume of 
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Figure 1. Impact on GDP 1988-1993. 
pollution control investments and costs, the direct import share of the 
investments, the transmission of pollution control costs in prices, the 
Philips relations, and the extent of "openness" of the economy. In 
addition, the difference in modeling large EC countries and small EC 
countries is of importance . 
A new element in this study, which explains a large part of the 
differences, is the incorporation of feedbacks from one country's pol-
lution control policy on other countries' economic performance. The 
magnitude of this impact is shown in Figures 1 and 2. They present 
the results of the EC directive (coordinated action) on the GDP in each 
country, relative to the situation in which only the domestic policy 
would be implemented (isolated action) . Other indicators show com-
parable influences (Klaassen et al., l 988b) . 
Comparison of the two figures clearly indicates that in the first period 
( 1988-1993) all countries benefit from coordinatio·n but especially open 
economies such as Belgium and the Netherlands, Spain, and Greece. 
In addition France benefits because it has no costs at all. In the second 
period, however, most countries are confronted with additional losses, 
expressed in the form of a lower GDP. The outstanding example here 
is Ireland, where the fall in gross domestic product results more from 
foreign than from domestic environmental policies. Other countries 
(France, Spain , Greece) , however, still benefit from coordination. For 
specific countries the results can be elucidated. The predominantly 
negative impact for Ireland results from the high import coefficient of 
the investments and from the large share of imports originating from 
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the EC. The high import leakage dampens the positive impact of the 
additional expenditures. Moreover, price increases, resulting from do-
mestic pollution control costs, are reinforced by the sharp increase in 
the prices of goods imported from EC countries. As a result compet-
itiveness deteriorates and exports, GDP, and employment are nega-
tively affected. 
Net impacts remain positive for Spain, Greece, France, and to a 
smaller extent Italy. In Spain the direct import coefficient of the in-
vestments is relatively small , which enforces the positive impact of 
the spending impulse . In addition, the relative export price of manu-
facturers improves in the second period (1994-1997) . This is also due 
to the fact that wage changes seem less responsive to price changes. 
Owing to the low level of pollution control costs the relative export 
price in Greece improves and Greece benefits from the EC pollution 
abatement program. The consequences for France are simply positive 
because the country does not incur any pollution control costs and 
hence France's competitiveness improves. The impacts for Italy are 
positive because of the smaller size of the pollution control program, 
and the small import coefficient of the investments. The smaller volume 
of Italian pollution control costs is the main reason why Italy ' s com-
petitiveness deteriorates less and even improves in the second period, 
resulting in a positive impact on GDP. 
The unequal distribution of positive and negative impacts is probably 
one of the reasons why the draft EC directive as discussed here was 
modified before being finally accepted. Another reason, most likely , 
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was the asymmetric distribution of environmental benefits. Given the 
prevailing wind directions and sulphur deposition patterns in Europe 
(Alcamo et al., 1987), countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Greece hardly benefit from pollution control measures 
in other EC countries . This stimulates them to oppose to coordinated 
actions. 
Summarizing, we may conclude that there are remarkable differ-
ences in results among countries. These are to a large extent a result 
of the impacts of one EC country's pollution control measures and 
costs on remaining countries ' economic development. Consequently, 
policymakers should look not only at national pollution control costs 
as the yardstick for equity, but ought to incorporate indirect economic 
impacts of coordination as well. 
6c. Elements of Uncertainty 
The reliability of these results depends on a number of factors. First, 
the quality of the input data on cost and investments is important. 
Pollution control investments and costs could be higher, especially for 
Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Costs probably would be 
lower if other pollution control strategies, such as energy conservation, 
fuel substitution, and the use of low-sulphur fuels, had been included. 
In the long run this would decrease the negative impacts. 
Second, the assumptions on exchange rate and on fiscal and monetary 
policies are important. A sensitivity analysis (Klaassen, l 988b) showed 
that the directive would have a more negative impact, especially for 
the large EC countries, if interest rates were floating instead of fixed, 
as was assumed. Employment, GDP, and government financial bal-
ances would be less positively influenced because of the increasing 
interest rates. Consumer prices, however, would be slightly lower. 
Third, the specific modifications made are of importance. The as-
sumption that pollution control investments do not directly crowd out 
other investments might have to be altered if a large share of the 
environmental investments had to be taken by industries instead of 
(semipublic) power plants. Furthermore, it was assumed that the direct 
import coefficient of environmental investments corresponded with the 
one for total business fixed investments. In the absence of specific data 
this may be a plausible assumption, but it may have led to an under-
estimation of positive effects for Germany. Nowadays this country is 
believed to have a leading role in the control of acidifying emissions 
in Europe. Another source of uncertainty is that no account has been 
taken of specific subsidies for pollution control in various member 
states . More important is that models for large EC countries include 
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a detailed supply block. This implies that in such models pollution 
control costs influence business profitability, and thus business in-
vestments, as well as prices of final demand. In small-country models 
the impact of pollution control costs had to be modeled in a simpler 
manner. This implies that a comparison of results for small and large 
countries is not without risks. 
Finally, the study excluded the macroeconomic impact of reductions 
in environmental damage. Although the extent of the damage reduction 
is uncertain, the positive macroeconomic impacts are probably under-
estimated, since damage reduction will increase productivity and re-
duce costs. These positive effects will compensate to an unknown 
extent, for the negative consequences of pollution control costs. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of these elements of uncertainty the major conclusions of 
this study are not affected . The proposed EC directive on large com-
bustion plants is likely to have small and positive macroeconomic 
impacts during the period in which the investments take place. In the 
subsequent period the directive is expected to have small but negative 
impacts on the main macroeconomic indicators of most EC countries. 
Remarkable differences in impacts between countries, however, are 
expected. Some countries benefit from coordination, whereas others 
have to bear additional costs as a result of the indirect impact of foreign 
pollution control costs on domestic economic performance. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Funding for this study was provided by the Commission of the 
European Community and the Netherlands Ministry of the Envi-
ronment. 
We would like to express our gratitude to the OECD Economics 
and Statistics Department and its staff, which enabled us to use and 
adapt the INTERLINK system. We especially would like to thank Pete 
Richardson, Peter Kee, Wim Hafkamp, and the editor for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article. The views expressed remain the 
sole responsibility of the authors. In no way do they reflect the opinion 
of the OECD or the EC on the results obtained. 
REFERENCES 
Alcamo, J., Amman, M., Hetteling, J.P., Holmberg, M., Hordijk, L. , Kiimiiri , J., Kaupi , L. , 
Kauppi , P., Komai , G., and Makela A. (1987) Acidification in Europe: A simulation 
model for evaluating control strategies . AMBIO 16: 232-245 . 
366 G. Klaassen and A. Nentjes 
Centraal Planbureau (1982) Economische gevolgen van voorgenomen mi/ieubeleid. Den Haag: 
Centraal Planbureau. 
Christainsen, G.B ., and Tietenberg, T.H. (1985) Distributional and macroeconomic aspects of 
environmental policy . In Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 1 
(A.V . Kneese and J.L. Sweeney , Eds .). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
EC Commission (1988) The Economics of 1992. European Economy, No. 35 . Brussels: EC. 
Eurostat (1987) Review 1976-1985 . Brussels: EEC. 
Haigh, N. (1989) New tools for European Air Pollution Control. International Environmental 
Affairs 1: 26- 37. 
Klaassen, G., Kee, P., Nentjes, A., Hafkamp, W., and Olsthoorn, A.A. (1988a) The Mac-
roeconomic Impacts of the EC Large Combustion Plants Directive Proposal: Economic 
Aspects of Co11trolli11g Acid Rain i11 Europe, vol. I. Luxemburg: Commission of the 
European Community. 
Klaassen , G., Kee , P., Nentjes, A., Hafkamp, W., and Olsthoorn, A.A . (1988b) The Mac-
roeconomic Impacts of the EC Large Combustion Plants . Directive Proposal, Technical 
Document I: Assessment of Investments, Costs and Emission Reduction; Technical Doc-
ument II: INTERLINK: Modification and Detailed Results, vol. 2 . Luxemburg: Com-
mission of the European Community. 
Llewellyn, J., and Richardson, P. (1985) Representing Recent Policy Concerns in OECD's 
Macroeconomic Model. OECD Economic Studies, No. 5. 
OECD (1984) The impact of environmental measures on the rate of economic growth, the rate 
of inflation, productivity and international trade. In Background Papers of the Interna-
tional Conference on Environment and Economics, June 18-21, 1984, vol. I. Paris: 
OECD Environment Directorate. 
OECD (1985) The Macro-economic Impact of Environmental Expenditure. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1987a) Economic Outlook 41. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1987b) Historical Statistics 1960-1985 . Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1988) OECD INTERLINK System Reference Manual. Paris: OECD. 
Richardson, P. (1988) The Structure and Simulation Properties ofOECD' s INTERLINK Model. 
OECD Economic Studies , No. JO. 
Rose, A. (1983) Modelling the Macroeconomic Impact of Air Pollution Abatement. Journal of 
Regional Science 23: 441-459. 
